In learning-to-rank problems, a privileged feature is one that is available during model training, but not available at test time. Such features naturally arise in merchandised recommendation systems; for instance, "user clicked this item" as a feature is predictive of "user purchased this item" in the offline data, but is clearly not available during online serving. Another source of privileged features is those that are too expensive to compute online but feasible to be added offline. Privileged features distillation (PFD) refers to a natural idea: train a "teacher" model using all features (including privileged ones) and then use it to train a "student" model that does not use the privileged features. In this paper, we first study PFD empirically on three public ranking datasets and an industrial-scale ranking problem derived from Amazon's logs. We show that PFD outperforms several baselines (no-distillation, pretraining-finetuning, self-distillation, and generalized distillation) on all these datasets. Next, we analyze why and when PFD performs well via both empirical ablation studies and theoretical analysis for linear models. Both investigations uncover an interesting non-monotone behavior: as the predictive power of a privileged feature increases, the performance of the resulting student model initially increases but then decreases. We show the reason for the later decreasing performance is that a very predictive privileged teacher produces predictions with high variance, which lead to high variance student estimates and inferior testing performance.

Advances in machine learning technologies have led to increasingly powerful models in particular in the context of big data. Yet, many application scenarios demand for robustly interpretable models rather than optimum model accuracy; as an example, this is the case if potential biomarkers or causal factors should be discovered based on a set of given measurements. In this contribution, we focus on feature selection paradigms, which enable us to uncover relevant factors of a given regularity based on a sparse model. We focus on the important specific setting of linear ordinal regression, i.e.\ data have to be ranked into one of a finite number of ordered categories by a linear projection. Unlike previous work, we consider the case that features are potentially redundant, such that no unique minimum set of relevant features exists. We aim for an identification of all strongly and all weakly relevant features as well as their type of relevance (strong or weak); we achieve this goal by determining feature relevance bounds, which correspond to the minimum and maximum feature relevance, respectively, if searched over all equivalent models. In addition, we discuss how this setting enables us to substitute some of the features, e.g.\ due to their semantics, and how to extend the framework of feature relevance intervals to the setting of privileged information, i.e.\ potentially relevant information is available for training purposes only, but cannot be used for the prediction itself.

For over a quarter century, security-relevant detection has been driven by models learned from input features collected from real or simulated environments. An artifact (e.g., network event, potential malware sample, suspicious email) is deemed malicious or non-malicious based on its similarity to the learned model at run-time. However, the training of the models has been historically limited to only those features available at run time. In this paper, we consider an alternate model construction approach that trains models using forensic "privileged" information--features available at training time but not at runtime--to improve the accuracy and resilience of detection systems. In particular, we adapt and extend recent advances in knowledge transfer, model influence, and distillation to enable the use of forensic data in a range of security domains. Our empirical study shows that privileged information increases detection precision and recall over a system with no privileged information: we observe up to 7.7% relative decrease in detection error for fast-flux bot detection, 8.6% for malware traffic detection, 7.3% for malware classification, and 16.9% for face recognition. We explore the limitations and applications of different privileged information techniques in detection systems. Such techniques open the door to systems that can integrate forensic data directly into detection models, and therein provide a means to fully exploit the information available about past security-relevant events.